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1. Introduction
By reforming the present merger control system as radically as needed, therefore,
I am determined to ensure that it remains a key instrument to foster Europe’s
economic success in the years ahead.
Mario Monti, EU Commissioner for Competition, 7 November 2002
The modernization of European merger control led to the adoption of Council Reg-
ulation 139/2004 in May 2004 (ECMR 04). Several observers interpreted this major
institutional change as a shock reaction to events that had happened in the early 2000s,
when three prohibition decisions of the Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp)
were overruled by the Court of First Instance (CFI).1 In all three successful appeals,
the CFI identified the main problems as being related to the rigor of economic analysis
conducted by DG Comp and the standard of proof the decision was based upon. While
these reverses certainly were an indicator of the need for reform, they were not the cause:
A Green Paper calling for a revision of European merger law had been published as early
as December 2001.
One of the major goals of the merger policy reform was to achieve what became known
as a ’more economic approach’ in merger control, i.e. an approach closer to economic
principles. Numerous important changes were made along these lines: an efficiency
defense clause was introduced, the office of the chief economist and her team were created,
the timetable for remedies was improved, guidelines for horizontal mergers were issued,
and the old ’dominance test’ (DT) was abandoned in favor of the ’significant impediment
of effective competition test’ (SIEC).2
The reception of the new merger regulation was generally favorable and since several
years have passed since its introduction, it is time to make a first assessment of its
effects. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive approach to empirically evaluate
whether the modernization of European merger control has succeeded in attaining the
goal of increasing its effectiveness. We analyze 368 mergers covering most major cases
scrutinized by DG Comp until December 2007 to empirically assess the economic impact
of the change in legislation and institutions brought about by the new ECMR 04. We
base our evaluation exercise on a number of maintained theoretical assumptions coming
from standard merger theory in an oligopolistic setting (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) and
the use of stock-market event studies to measure the effect of mergers and merger control
decisions. From this starting point, we propose four dimensions of effectiveness of merger
1The cases in question are Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel.
2Lyons (2004) discusses these reforms in greater detail. The problems with the DT and the advantages
of the SIEC are summed up in Vickers (2004).
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policy: predictability, decision errors, rent-reversion, and deterrence. For each of these,
we adopt a before-and-after approach to single out the effects of the reform.
First, we test the predictability of the European merger control procedure. We esti-
mate a probit model, where the decisions of DG Comp are functions of ex-ante observable
characteristics intended to emulate the firms’ or markets’ expectations around the noti-
fication of a transaction. We find that the ex-ante predictability of the merger review
process increases post-reform.
Second, we assess whether the introduction of the new merger regulation has influenced
the frequency and determinants of systematic mistakes made by the EU Commission
(EC).3 We distinguish cases in which DG Comp remedied a merger that the stock market
regarded as pro-competitive (type I errors) from cleared mergers that were regarded as
anti-competitive (type II errors). Welfare neutral cases, i.e. cases where rivals’ abnormal
returns neither significantly increase nor decrease are significantly more frequent after
the reform. Conditional on this result, we find that the frequency of type I errors has
significantly decreased in the post-reform period.
In a third step, we estimate the degree of rent-reversion induced by the different merger
control instruments used by DG Comp. Under a set of maintained assumptions, the
negative relation between the abnormal returns around the EC’s decision and those
around the merger’s announcement can be interpreted to indicate the success of merger
policy in eliminating anti-competitive rents created by a merger (Duso, Gugler, and
Yurtoglu, 2011). We find that prohibitions significantly and substantially reverse anti-
competitive rents pre-reform, whereas the effectiveness of remedies appears to be limited
before as well as after the introduction of ECMR 04.
Finally, we look at the deterrent effects of merger control. An effective competition
policy should induce firms to obey antitrust rules and deter firms from proposing anti-
competitive mergers. Yet, it should not over-deter, i.e. discourage firms from proposing
efficiency-increasing combinations. Thus, we estimate the probability of a merger to be
pro- or anti-competitive as a function of past EC decisions. This is a novel approach and
adds to the limited literature that has looked at whether merger policy tools affect the
number of notified mergers (Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros, 2009) or the proportion
of horizontal to total mergers (Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2010). We find that pre-
reform prohibitions reduce the likelihood that anti-competitive mergers are notified, while
they do not affect the probability of pro-competitive mergers (no over-deterrence). After
3The terms DG Comp and European Commission (or EC) will be used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
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2004, there was a policy shift away from prohibitions and the deterrence properties of
prohibitions are replaced by those of withdrawn mergers and phase I remedies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is concerned with the identification of anti-
competitive mergers and our assumptions. Section 3 presents the sources of the data,
some summary statistics, and the estimations of the merger announcement and merger
decision effects by means of stock-market event studies. Section 4 presents the method-
ologies and results of the probability of intervention estimation, the analysis of the fre-
quency and determinants of type I and type II errors, the rent-reversion regressions, and
the deterrence regressions respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2. Identification
The starting point of the methodology is that merger control aims to avoid anti-competitive
(i.e. consumer welfare decreasing) mergers by either blocking, remedying or deterring
them. One of the main challenges in the empirical assessment of merger control is the
ability to, first, define and, second, measure the anti-competitive nature of a merger.
Next, we clearly state the assumptions needed to address these identification and quan-
tification issues.
We define an anti-competitive merger as one that reduces consumer welfare. Our basic
setting is a standard static merger model in oligopolistic markets. The well-documented
result of this literature is that mergers exert two externalities on rivals. The market power
effect captures the impact of the reduction in competition brought about by a combi-
nation, absent any efficiency gains (Stigler, 1950). The efficiency effect (Williamson,
1968), relies on the assumption of merger-specific synergies: Economies of scale, knowl-
edge sharing, patent-pooling, etc., allow the merged entity to produce more efficiently
than before, increasing the competitive pressure on its rivals and thus exerting a negative
externality on them.
In most mergers both effects co-exist and what matters for welfare is the net effect
of these antipodal forces. As Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show, there exists a critical
level of efficiency gains such that the market power effect is exactly compensated for and
the new equilibrium price and aggregate production is the same pre- and post-merger.
Looking at this net effect thus allows us to infer the competitive nature of a merger.
When the efficiency gains are not enough to compensate for the market power effect,
rival profits increase and consumer surplus decreases, since prices are higher than before
the merger. The identifying assumption of our framework thus is that a post-merger
increase in competitors’ profits is an indication of the merger being anti-competitive.
4
A few examples might illustrate the empirical relevance of this identification strategy.
On November 12, 2009, two large mergers were announced one of which was viewed as
clearly anticompetitive and the other as clearly pro-competitive by the business press.
British Airways (BA) and Iberia announced their decision to merge, creating the world’s
third largest airline after Air France-KLM and Lufthansa. The share prices of BA and
Iberia rose by around 10% and 15%, respectively around this announcement. Likewise,
their main rivals, Lufthansa and Air France-KLM, outperformed the stock market by 6
and 5% respectively. Many commentators viewed this merger as anticompetitive, mainly
on the grounds that the Oneworld alliance (i.e. BA’s alliance) already had a "tight
grip" on the Heathrow airport, and the merger would make matters worse particularly
concerning take-off and landing slots (see e.g. AFX News, November 13, 2009). The
observed announcement abnormal returns are consistent with this interpretation. The
same day, Hewlett-Packard (HP) announced the takeover of 3Com, paying a 40% pre-
mium over the pre-announcement share price. Despite that, HP shares outperformed the
Dow Jones by 2%. The deal was widely seen as being aimed at Cisco Systems, the leader
in computer networking (see e.g. Jordan Robertson, November 12, 2009, AP Technology,
"HP’s 3Com takeover marks a shot at Cisco"), since the biggest companies that provide
corporate computing infrastructure try to become "one-stop technology shops". Thus,
3Com assets are complementary to HP’s and allow HP to offer more integrated solu-
tions to customers. Cisco lost 2% in value on the day of the announcement of the deal,
precisely in line with the idea that the stock market believed it to be a pro-competitive
takeover.
The proposed identification assumption is quite general and robust and holds for a
wide class of oligopoly models, particularly when investigating the unilateral effects of
horizontal mergers in a static setting. However, some caveats are in order: identification
might not be achieved in the case of vertical or conglomerate mergers and mergers in a
dynamic context. In the former case, a merger could be to the detriment of both rivals
and consumers if it entails market foreclosure. In a dynamic setting (Nocke and Whin-
ston, 2010) identification depends on the sequence of notified mergers and is therefore
achieved only under specific conditions. We try to account for these shortcomings in
our identification strategy by running a robustness check excluding not purely horizontal
mergers in appendix B.1.
The next step is to measure the profitability effects brought about by the merger.
Following an extensive literature, we use stock market reactions to the merger announce-
ments, i.e. a stock-market event study. This methodology relies on the semi-strong
version of the efficient capital market hypothesis, which asserts that stock prices fully
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reflect the information available to the market on the given commodity at any point in
time.
Under this assumption, we can estimate the coefficients of a market model to predict
the ’normal’ returns4 of a firm (see appendix A.1 for details) and calculate the ’abnormal’
returns that accrue due to the announcement of an event as the difference between the
predicted and the actual returns. To account for information leakages, we sum up the
abnormal returns over a specific time interval called the event window (appendix A.2)
obtaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are subsequently aggregated
into cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), market value weighted profitabil-
ity measures for both merging firms and competitors (see appendix A.3). Finally, we
estimate the probability of an intervention by the EC and use it to correct for market
expectations (this is described in detail in appendix A.4).
The measured CAARs around a merger’s announcement might entail effects other than
the pure competitive effects and, in particular, the effects of specific forces triggering the
merger (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), information about the roles of merging firms and
rivals (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2010), and the market expectations about the outcome
of the merger control decision (Eckbo, 1992). The third important assumption of our
methodology is that we can effectively control for the merger’s triggering events and
the allocation of roles, by choosing the right announcement dates and event windows.
We use the date of the first merger-specific rumors in the business press as the merger
announcement (Banerjee and Eckard, 1998). The surprise element to the stock market
is likely to be largest around this date, since the likelihood that the merger is already
anticipated is still low. Moreover, using the merger-specific rumors coupled with a large
event window ranging from 50 trading days before to 5 trading days after the merger
announcement should help us to control for the uncertainty in the allocation of the roles
(acquirer, target, rival) (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2010).
Given our setup, we are then confident that the corrected CAARs around merger j’s
announcement (ΠA∗fj ) can be seen as a meaningful measure of the competitive effect of
the merger on merging firms (f = M) or competitors (f = C). While this measure of
the competitive impact of a merger is not the main subject of analysis in this study,
it allows us to empirically achieve the theoretical identification previously discussed: we
classify a merger to be anti-competitive, if its impact on competitors’ profits is sufficiently
positive, i.e. ΠA∗Cj exceeds a certain threshold p¯i. Symmetrically, a merger is classified as
pro-competitive if ΠA∗Cj is smaller than −p¯i. This means that, for any positive value of
4We use the total return index from Datastream, which accounts for dividends and corrects for stock
splits.
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p¯i, we define a symmetric interval around 0, where mistakes cannot be defined since the
mergers are considered to be welfare neutral. Since the choice of the threshold level p¯i is
necessarily arbitrary, we consider different values for p¯i, namely p¯i = 0, p¯i = 3%, p¯i = 5%,
and p¯i = 10%. In the main regressions reported in the paper, we adopt an intermediate
threshold of ±3%.5 In appendix B.3 we discuss the robustness of our results to the use
of different threshold values.
A final assumption, which is however only needed for the effectiveness regressions in
table 8, is that the market power and efficiency effects of a merger can, at least partially,
be separated by an effective antitrust action: Well-implemented remedies imposed by
the EC should eliminate the market power effect while preserving the efficiency gains
generated by the merger. We thus assume that the corrected CAARs around the EC’s
decision on merger j (ΠD∗fj ) can be seen as a meaningful measure of the effect of the
decision on profitability. For the phase 1 decision, we use a short window of 11 days (-5,
+5), since information leakages are likely to be modest before the phase 1 decision given
the strict timing of the EU merger control procedure. For a phase 2 decision, however,
we use the long window of 56 days (-50, +5) to account for information leakages due to
the investigation and negotiation process during that phase (see also Appendix A.2). All
of these assumptions as well as the consequences of their failure are discussed in length
and justified in greater detail in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011).
3. Data
3.1. Data Sources
Our sample includes 368 merger cases scrutinized by the EC from the beginning of 1990
to the end of 2007 and was designed to mimic the dynamics of the population of EC
merger cases prior to and after ECMR 04. We collected information on as many phase
2 mergers as possible, together with a random sample of phase 1 merger cases. By
carefully reading the text of publicly available merger cases handled by DG Comp, we
identified the merging parties, their rivals, relevant markets, decision types, the dates of
the notification, phase 1 and possibly phase 2 decision, and some other merger-specific
characteristics.6
Using the EC’s merger assessment to identify the rivals represents a particular strength
of this sample. It has the big advantage of being a much more realistic description of the
5Note that an average CAAR of 3% for the competitors sums up to quite large effects in terms of value.
At the mean value of our sample this average effect is more than 63 million US dollars.
6All documents are publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
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relevant markets than, say, using SIC codes, which would yield a sample of firms active
in the same branch, but possibly not competing in the specific product market concerned
by the merger.
Following Banerjee and Eckard (1998), the announcement date of a merger is defined
as the date on which the first rumors of that particular merger leaked to the market.
This is usually before the official notification to the EC as well as the official merger
announcement. We used the financial press and the Dow Jones Interactive database to
identify the dates at which the first definitive indications of the combination between
the merging parties became known.7 The total return index, market value and branch
index time series for the identified parties were downloaded from the Thomson Reuters
Datastream database, providing daily data for the variables in question.
3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the variables in our dataset for the periods before and after the
merger policy reform, information on the population of EC mergers is included where
available.
[insert Table 1 here]
In our sample, the percentage of cases that were cleared with remedies decreases from
42.1% in the pre-reform period to 33.6% post-reform. This mimics the 20% decrease in
remedies in the EC mergers’ population from 6.9% to 5.5% during the respective periods.
The same is true when looking at the phase in which the remedies were applied: Phase
1 remedies increase from 14.4% to 23.7% in the sample and from 4.1% to 4.4% in the
population, while the use of phase 2 remedies is strongly reduced in both the sample
(from 27.8% to 9.9%) and the population (from 2.8% to 1.1%). Thus, while we over-
sample cases with remedies - which are our main interest - our sample exhibits very
similar dynamics as the population of EC merger cases does. Prohibitions go down from
5.2% to 1.3% of the cases pre- and post-reform in the sample, and from 0.8% to 0.01% in
the population. Similarly, the ratio of cases going to phase 2 drops from 42.1% to 17.8%
in the sample and from 5.5% to 3.2% in the population. All other cases have been cleared
without conditions and obligations. For the population data, we also have information
on aborted or withdrawn cases.8 These represent 3.3% and 2.4% of the notified cases
7As a robustness check, we collected data on the merger’s official announcement date from the SDC
database (Thomson Reuters) and were able to identify 240 of our mergers. Most of the official
announcements are in an interval around five days before and two days after the first rumors.
8Since in these cases no formal decision is published, we lack the information on rivals necessary for
inclusion in the sample.
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pre- and post-reform, respectively. We thus, while oversampling cases which resulted in
an action by the EC, made an effort to reconstruct the evolution of the population in
the sample. For the same reason we also sampled the same relative amount of cases pre-
and post-reform: our sample accounts for 9% of the population in both periods.
For the mergers in our sample, we also report some additional information. The pro-
portions of geographic market definitions (national, EU-wide, worldwide) do not change
much between the two periods. The proportion of conglomerate and full mergers in-
creases, that of cross-border mergers slightly increases, while barriers to entry are found
less often in the post-reform period. Dominant firms (equal to 1 if one market participant
in a relevant market has a market share in excess of 50% prior to the merger), as well
as firms from the US or a big EU country (Germany, France, Italy, Spain or the UK)
are observed with approximately the same frequency before and after ECMR 04. The
average market values of both merging firms and rivals increase.
[insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows the evolution of notifications and actions in the population of EU
mergers. We observe an increasing trend in notifications with a single big drop around
2002. The proportion of remedies in phase 2 oscillates before 1999 and then takes a
downward trend, while the proportion of remedies in phase 1 increases. The prohibitions
ratio displays a downward trend, with only two prohibitions after the merger reform.
3.3. Structure of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
Table 2 reports the mean CAARs around the announcement and the decision of mergers
for merging firms and rivals, in the pre- and post-reform periods respectively.
[insert Table 2 here]
On average, the mergers in the sample are profitable for merging firms pre-reform and
yield an increase in their stock value of around 1.6%, which is significant at the 5%
confidence level. After the reform, mergers are still significantly profitable for merging
firms with an average CAAR of 1.4%. The impact of DG Comp’s decisions on the
valuation of merging firms is negative pre- and post- reform and entails an insignificant
drop in the firms’ stock value by 0.3% pre-reform, which increases to 0.8%, significant at
the 10% level post-reform.
The competitors’ merger announcement effects are positive (0.8%) but not significant
prior to the reform, and are of equal magnitude but become significant at the 10% level
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post-reform. Similar to the merging firms, rivals suffer an average negative reaction
around the EC decision date: an insignificant effect of -0.3% increases to -0.8% post-
reform and becomes significant at the 10% level.
4. Methodology & Results
In this section we describe the methodological approaches9 to and present the empirical
results on the four dimensions of effectiveness considered in this article. The objective
of this analysis is to use this framework to measure the impact of the modernization
package of European merger control by comparing the periods pre-reform (January 1990
to May 2004) and post-reform (June 2004 to the end of 2007).10
The four dimensions of policy effectiveness can be seen in a natural chronological
order. First, before the announcement of a merger, the predictability of the merger
control procedure is an important determinant of firms’ choices on the kind of merger
proposed and its welfare consequences. Therefore, the first test analyzes the determinants
of interventions by DG Comp to infer its predictability. The second event we look at
is the EC decision. An effective policy should reduce mistakes. Thus, we analyze the
frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors committed by the EC. Third, it
is not only important whether the EC intervenes in the ’right’ mergers, but also whether
its intervention achieves the desired results. Thus, we look at the degree of rent-reversion
achieved by the different merger policy instruments. Finally, a particular decision might
have consequences on the future merger behavior of other firms. We therefore analyze
the deterrence effects of the EC’s merger policy by estimating how past interventions
affect the competitive nature of currently proposed mergers.
4.1. Predictability
We estimate the degree of ex-ante predictability of EC merger decisions based on observ-
ables. Let Pj be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which is equal to
1 when the merger is remedied or blocked (action) and zero otherwise (clear). Let Xj
be a set of observable characteristics related to the specific merger. Note that for the
estimation of this model none of the assumptions related to event-studies are required.
9The methodology has partially been developed in previous work (Duso, Neven, and Röller, 2007; Duso,
Gugler, and Yurtoglu, 2011) and is partially newly designed here.
10We chose the date in which the new merger regulation legally came into force to define the pre- and
post- reform periods. However in appendix B.2, we discuss the robustness of our results to the choice
of a different date.
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We measure the predictability of the decision on the basis of goodness of fit measures of
the following regression:11
Pj = α0 + α1Xj + εj (1)
This model is supposed to provide a measurement of how well the parties notifying a
merger can anticipate the outcome of DG Comp’s investigation. Thus the explanatory
variables in this model are limited to some merger specific variables (full, cross-border and
conglomerate merger dummies, market values), variables related to the firms’ country of
origin (US and big EU countries), measures of past decision records of the EC (lagged
notifications, antitrust actions and merger withdrawals) as well as industry dummies and
a time trend. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of these variables on the EC’s decision.
[insert Table 3 here]
In the post-reform period, both the R2 and the percentage of correct predictions in-
crease by over 5%. Although the pseudo R-squared is quite low, the ability of the model
to correctly predict the outcome based on these few external factors is quite high and it
increases from 71% to 76% in the post-reform period. In the pre-reform period, we ob-
serve four significant predictors: mergers involving firms from the US are 26% less likely
to be challenged; full mergers (as opposed to share acquisitions or joint ventures), con-
glomerate mergers, and mergers where the parties have high market values are more likely
to receive scrutiny. After the reform, the likelihood of regulatory intervention is lower
for mergers involving US firms (34% lower probability), full and cross-border mergers
(6% and 7% lower probability respectively) and higher for conglomerate mergers (higher
probability by 20%). Moreover, the number of lagged notifications becomes a significant
predictor of the outcome suggesting that DG Competition intervenes less if the workload
is high during the past quarter. Mergers among large firms in terms of market value are
less likely to be challenged but the size of the competitors has a positive yet not strongly
significant effect on the likelihood of intervention.
4.2. Type I and Type II Errors
The first assessment of a particular decision is whether it conforms to the objectives
of merger control. A benevolent agency intervenes in a merger if and only if consumer
surplus (CS) is reduced, hence the optimal decision rule for merger j is:
11Since we assume that the error terms εj are correlated over time, we allow for clustering at the year
level.
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Dj =
0 (clear) if ∆CSj ≥ 01 (action) if ∆CSj < 0
Let Pj again be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which is equal to
1 if the merger is remedied or blocked, and zero otherwise. We say a type I error occurs if
the agency intervenes in a merger that should have been cleared without commitments,
i.e. E1j = 1 if Pj = 1 and Dj = 0, else 0, and a type II error when the agency clears a
merger that should have been blocked or remedied, i.e. E2j = 1 if Pj = 0 and Dj = 1,
else 0.12
To measure E1j and E2j , we need to measure Dj , which requires an estimate of the
impact of the merger on consumer surplus. Under our maintained assumptions, consumer
surplus decreases after the merger when the profits of the rivals to the merging firms
increase sufficiently. Hence, the consumer welfare-maximizing merger control decision is:
Dj =
0 if ΠA∗Cj < −p¯i1 if ΠA∗Cj > p¯i
where ΠA∗Cj represents the corrected merger announcement CAAR of the competitors
(C) for merger j and p¯i is either 0%, 3%, 5%, or 10%.
Under our assumptions, the definition of type II errors is not problematic, especially
when we use a demanding threshold: these are anti-competitive cases where the EC
did not intervene. The definition of type I errors, instead, might be more cumbersome.
Even if a merger is on average pro-competitive as captured by a negative value for ΠA∗Cj ,
it might still be that it entails some anti-competitive concerns, which could effectively
be tackled by means of appropriate remedies. It would then be correct for the EC to
intervene and we would wrongly identify this case as a type I error. Yet, also in this case
the choice of a demanding threshold for the definition of pro-competitive mergers might
help us to correctly identify true type I errors. Mergers which are clearly pro-competitive
are less likely to entail anti-competitive elements. Because of these considerations, we
will base our analysis on a threshold p¯i = 3%. Results based on other thresholds are
discussed as robustness checks.
Once we have defined type I and type II errors, we analyze their determinants by
running the following probit regressions:
12The notion of type I errors we use here corresponds therefore to the weak type I errors in Duso, Neven,
and Röller (2007). Given that prohibitions were a very rare event in the entire sample and, especially,
in the post-reform period, it would be impossible to perform any econometric analysis on the strong
type I errors, i.e. pro-competitive mergers which were blocked.
12
E1j = α0 + α1Xj + εj if Dj = 1 (2)
E2j = β0 + β1Xj + εj if Dj = 0 (3)
We consider a number of potential determinants of decision errors: as shown by Aktas,
de Bodt, and Roll (2007), the European Commission might be protectionist and favor
European versus US firms, hence the country of origin of the merging parties might be a
determinant of the EC’s mistakes. The size of the country from which the merging firms
originate could also play a role in the outcome of a merger investigation, presumably (but
not exclusively) because of the political pressure that can be exerted by large countries
(e.g. Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993) and Horn and Levinsohn (2001)). A merger
involving conglomerate concerns or a full merger as compared to a partial merger or a
joint venture might be seen as more problematic since the anti-competitive effects that it
generates might be expected to be larger (e.g. Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and Gugler
and Siebert (2007)), whereas a cross-border merger might be treated more leniently since
the market power aspects might be less problematic (Neary, 2007). Moreover, the EC
was often alleged to define relevant markets too narrowly, which might imply a lower
frequency of errors when the market is either EU- or worldwide (Neven, Nuttall, and
Seabright, 1993). Finally, procedural issues, such as the time available to undertake the
merger analysis, may be important. In particular whether the case has been decided
in phase 1 instead of being subject to a more substantial phase 2 investigation might
influence the likelihood of errors.
Mergers are categorized on the basis of their effects on rivals’ profits. We propose
to achieve this by using CAARs and a threshold p¯i to better identify the clearly anti-
competitive or pro-competitive mergers. The larger the interval [-p¯i,p¯i], the more mergers
are defined to be welfare neutral. Table 4 reports the composition of mergers.
[insert Table 4 here]
Post-reform, the percentage of welfare neutral mergers significantly grows by 17%-20%
independently of the threshold and this increase is compensated by an equal decrease
in pro- and anti-competitive mergers. This has two implications for our further tests.
First, it means that the EC should commit less type I and type II errors after the reform,
due to the change in the nature of proposed mergers. Second, whether this composition
change is due to the changes in merger policy enforcement or other determinants can be
analyzed in the discussion of deterrence.
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To assess how the new merger regulation affected the likelihood and determinants of
the EC’s mistakes, we run the basic regressions 2 and 3 separately on the pre- and post-
reform sub-samples. Table 5 reports the frequencies of decision errors within the pro-
and anti-competitive sub-samples using different thresholds for the definition of pro- and
anti-competitiveness.
[insert Table 5 here]
The propensity of committing type II errors (unconditional clearance of an anti-
competitive merger) significantly increases post-reform when we use the 0% threshold,
it increases only weakly and not significantly with the 3% and 5% definitions, and it
even decreases when employing a 10% threshold. The propensity of committing type I
errors (action in a pro-competitive merger) decreases by more than 10% with all four
thresholds, and in most cases the difference is significant at the 10% level. Thus, the
decrease in the frequency of type I errors seems to be more robust and does not depend
on the chosen threshold. From now on, we use the definition based on p¯i = 3%. Results
based on the other thresholds are discussed in appendix B.3. The regression results of
equation (2) are reported in table 6.
[insert Table 6 here]
If one of the merging parties is a US-based firm, the likelihood of wrongly eliciting an
action in pro-competitive mergers is, ceteris paribus, 20% lower in the pre-reform period
and 25% lower after the reform. Similarly, type I errors are almost 20% less likely in case
of cross-border mergers both pre- and post-reform. Full mergers, and mergers involving
large firms and large competitors in terms of market value are more likely to elicit a type
I error pre-reform. Post-reform, pro-competitive conglomerate mergers are 75% more
likely to be remedied than non-conglomerate mergers. Since the identification of the
competitive nature of these mergers is problematic, one should be careful in interpreting
this result.
All investigation variables (barriers to entry, phase 2, and national markets) signif-
icantly increase the likelihood of a type I error pre-reform. Post reform most results
remain the same, yet the phase 2 dummy does not correlate with the likelihood of an
error anymore. The model’s predictive power is high both in terms of pseudo−R2 (de-
creasing from 0.74 pre-reform to 0.65 post-reform) and in terms of correct predications
(90% and 87% pre- and post-reform respectively).
We then move to the estimation of equation (3), the determinants of type II errors.
The marginal effects of the probit estimations are reported in table 7.
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[insert Table 7 here]
We estimate significantly more type II errors in mergers involving US firms both pre-
and post-reform (13% and 19% respectively). Conglomerate mergers are 30% less likely to
elicit a type II error both pre- and post-reform. Full and cross-border mergers significantly
increase the likelihood of a type II error only post-reform by 23% and 14% respectively.
Merging parties’ market values negatively and significantly affect the probability of type
II errors pre-reform, while increasing it post-reform. On the contrary, the coefficient for
rivals is negative and significant in both periods.
Except for barriers to entry, which reduce the likelihood of type II errors significantly
pre- and post-reform, the effects of the other investigation variables changed after the in-
troduction of ECMR 04. A narrow geographic market definition does not reduce anymore
the probability of a mistake. Moreover, conditional on a merger being anti-competitive,
the opening of a phase 2 investigation significantly increases type II errors post reform
while it significantly decreased it before. Again the predictions of the model are quite ac-
curate with a pre-reform pseudo−R2 of over 60% (50% post-reform) and the percentage
of correct predictions of 89% and 83% in the pre- and post-reform periods respectively.
4.3. Rent-Reversion
The next step is to assess the ability of different policy tools to effectively reduce the
market power effects of a merger and, at the same time, to maintain the benefits to
consumers generated by increased efficiency. The logic behind the approach developed
by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) is that there should be a reversion of the (anti-
competitive) rents measured around the merger announcement due to the decision, if the
antitrust action is effective. This implies that decision CAARs should be systematically
negatively related to announcement CAARs when a decision is effective. We therefore as-
sess the effectiveness of an antitrust action by running the following regression separately
for merging firms and rivals:
ΠD∗fj =
∑
d
αfd +
∑
d
βfdΠA∗fj + γfXj + fj (4)
where ΠD∗fj is the probability-corrected decision CAAR of merging firms (f = M) and
competitors (f = C), respectively, for merger j, while ΠA∗fj is the probability-corrected
announcement CAAR. We estimate different intercepts (αs) and slopes (βs) for the dif-
ferent decisions (d=clearance, phase1 remedies, phase2 remedies, or prohibition).
Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) explain in depth the sizes and signs of the intercepts
and slopes, which are expected if merger control is perfectly effective and under our
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maintained assumptions. Prohibitions are the most extreme action taken by the EC
and should dissipate all rents, i.e. both the market power and the efficiency rents (i.e.
αfd = 0, βfd = −1 if d = prohibition). If a merger is cleared without commitments, we
do not expect decision effects that are systematically related to announcement returns
(i.e. αfd = 0, βfd = 0 if d = clearence). This does not need to be the case if the reaction
around the decision date conveys good news to the market about the feasibility of future
mergers, in which case rivals would profit. In the case of remedies, only market power
rents should be dissipated by the antitrust decision if it is effective. Hence, each remedial
action should entail a negative decision effect for merging firms and rivals (i.e. αfd < 0,
βfd < 0 if d = remedies).
We estimate equation (4) for the merging parties and their rivals separately, while
pooling pre- and post-reform observations and interacting the independent variables with
pre/post dummies. The estimated coefficients measure the rent-reversion achieved by the
respective decisions of DG Comp. The regression results reported in table 8 for the pre-
reform period are in line with those obtained by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) for
the years 1990-2002.
[insert Table 8 here]
The slope coefficient for prohibitions is significantly negative and large for both merging
firms (-1.27) and rivals (-0.44), where rent reversion is reinforced by the significantly
negative prohibition constant (-0.31). However, for both types of firms remedies do
not seem to entail significant rent reversion. Furthermore we find that clearances have a
positive coefficient for the rivals, suggesting that they were a positive signal. Post-reform,
we cannot estimate the degree of rent-reversion achieved by prohibitions, since only two
mergers were blocked. Remedies applied after a phase 2 investigation even increase the
returns of both merging parties and rivals. Unconditional clearances still have a positive
impact on the returns of rivals.
4.4. Deterrence
As pointed out by Sørgard (2009), there is an optimal level of enforcement where some
actions, which in isolation would be welfare detrimental can be optimal to achieve de-
terrence and thus increase overall welfare. Hence, the role of deterrence is especially
important if the competition authority commits errors and if remedies are not com-
pletely effective. If this was not the case and merger policy was perfectly effective, then
firms would know ex-ante that every anti-competitive merger would be blocked or effec-
tively remedied by the antitrust authority and, therefore, they would not even attempt to
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propose such combinations. Moreover, in the absence of type I errors, firms would always
propose a pro-competitive merger knowing that it would always be cleared. Hence, the
existence of decision mistakes is a key ingredient in a deterrence model.
Key to the analysis of deterrence in merger control is that a good policy should deter
firms from proposing socially detrimental mergers but it should not over-deter, that is,
discourage firms from proposing efficiency-increasing combinations. Our analysis takes
an important step in this direction if compared to the limited existing literature (e.g.
Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros (2009) and Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2010)).
For each merger, we define a categorical variable (Djt) which takes on a value of 1 if the
merger is pro-competitive (ΠA∗Cj < −p¯i), 2 if the merger is welfare neutral (−p¯i ≤ ΠA∗Cj ≤ p¯i),
and 3 if the merger is anti-competitive (ΠA∗Cj > p¯i). We can then analyze how past
decisions affect the odds of a particular merger to be pro- or anti-competitive when
compared to the reference category of welfare neutral mergers. Hence, we can separately
look at whether merger policy enforcement deters anti-competitive mergers without over-
deterring welfare increasing combinations.13 In particular, we look at how the complete
merger policy enforcement’s history of the EC affected the competitive nature of the
mergers in our sample. We thus combine measures of DG Comp’s merger policy from
the entire population of over 3,800 mergers scrutinized in the sample period with our
dataset to estimate a multinomial logit equation of the following type:
Djt = α0 + α1(nt−1 + nt−2) +
∑
d
α2d
dt−1 + dt−2
nt−1 + nt−2
+ α3Xj + j (5)
The variable nt−i is equal to the total number of notifications to the EC i quarters
before merger j was notified, and dt−i is the total number of mergers with decision d
(d = remedies, blockings, or withdrawals) i quarters ago. We thus regress the indicator
of the merger’s competitive nature on the total number of notifications in the last two
quarters and on the ratios of possible actions over total notifications. Again, we control
for other merger specific determinants Xj .
The lagged number of notifications controls for merger wave effects. While several
studies show that merger waves can be driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of
the stock market (e.g. Gugler, Mueller, Weichselbaumer, and Yurtoglu (2012), Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Harford (2005)), very few studies have looked at how
merger waves might impact the competitive effects of a merger (e.g. Gugler, Mueller,
and Weichselbaumer (2012), and Clougherty and Duso (2009)).
13If p¯i = 0 our model collapses to a simple probit model. In such a model the effect of the explanatory
variables on the likelihood of a merger of being pro- and anti-competitive is symmetric.
17
More importantly, the kind of merger policy decisions and their effectiveness send
signals to firms about the toughness of the authority. If merger policy deters anti-
competitive mergers, one should expect negative coefficients for all kinds of actions. The
kind of signal a particular decision sends to the firms and, hence, the kind of merger the
firms propose, crucially depends on the expectations the firms have about the merger
policy (Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros, 2009). It is quite clear that prohibitions
have a deterrence effect, as they represent the toughest action an antitrust authority can
take. Similarly, one could argue that when the merger parties withdraw or abort a noti-
fied merger, this might be interpreted as an ’almost-prohibition’ (Bergman, Jakobsson,
and Razo, 2005) and, therefore, this can be expected to have similar deterrence effects.
The deterrence effects of remedies are not so clear cut and depend on whether they come
at the expense of clearances or prohibitions: if the antitrust authority imposes remedies
on mergers which were expected to be cleared unconditionally, this signals a tough an-
titrust stance while remedying mergers which were expected to be blocked signals that
merger control has become more lenient. Finally, if the policy achieves ’good deterrence’,
then none of the EC’s actions should negatively affect the likelihood of pro-competitive
mergers.
We estimate the model (5) on the full sample interacting the independent variables
with pre- and post-reform dummies and adding a time trend and a post reform dummy.
The coefficient estimates of the multinomial probit estimation are reported in table 9.
[insert Table 9 here]
We estimate a negative and significant coefficient for the prohibitions ratio in the
pre-reform period for the anti-competitive outcome. When the EC increases the use of
prohibitions in the two quarters prior to a newly notified merger, its likelihood of being
anti-competitive is significantly lower. This is not the case for clearly pro-competitive
mergers, thus prohibitions do not seem to over-deter. Unexpectedly, the ratio of mergers
withdrawn in phase 1 as well as in phase 2 increases both pro- and anti-competitive
notifications.
While remedies do not affect the odds of pro-competitive mergers post-reform, phase 1
remedies deter anti-competitive mergers and phase 2 remedies seem to encourage them.
Both the phase 1 and phase 2 abortions ratios significantly deter anti-competitive merg-
ers, with phase 2 abortions having the larger effect. Abortions in phase 1 also significantly
discourage pro-competitive notifications. Once again, we cannot test for the effects of
prohibitions post-reform, but withdrawals or abortions appear to at least partially take
over their deterrent role. One possible interpretation of these findings is that firms were
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pushed by the EC to withdraw particularly problematic mergers by setting the anti-
competitive concerns at such a high level that any kind of remedy would have become
too costly. Hence, these withdrawals/abortions might have been effective prohibitions.14
5. Conclusion
In our attempt to assess the economic impact of the change in legislation due to the
2004 merger policy reform in Europe, we brought forward four pieces of evidence: (1)
estimations of the determinants of intervention, (2) estimations of the frequency and
determinants of type I and type II errors, (3) estimations of rent-reversion by merger
decisions, and (4) estimations of the deterrence effect of merger decisions. These elements
are meant to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the entire process of merger control.
The identification of the reform’s effects is achieved by comparing the performance of
merger control along these four dimensions in the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the transparency
of the antitrust procedure from an ex-ante point of view has improved. We observe an
increase in the number of significant predictors of the probability of an action, as well as
increases of the R2s and correct predictions between the two periods. This suggests that
it has become easier for the market and the firms to form a prior about the outcome of
the investigation.
Second, we observe that more welfare neutral mergers have been proposed post-reform,
leaving less room for decision errors. Conditional on this, the percentage of type I
errors significantly decreased after the introduction of ECMR 04, independently of the
threshold used to define pro-competitive mergers. The percentage of type II errors,
instead, slightly increases or decreases depending on the adopted thresholds. We analyze
the determinants of the errors and find that merger characteristics as well as procedural
issues systematically affect mistakes. For instance, US firms seem to be treated more
leniently than other firms.
Third, according to our rent-reversion regressions, remedies are not effective before as
well as after the reform. Some outright clearances are seen by the market as good news
for the rivals, possibly indicating the cost of type II errors by the EC. Only prohibitions
achieve substantial rent-reversion, however, we can estimate their effect only pre-reform
since only two mergers were blocked post-reform. Given the undisputed effectiveness of
14As noticed by Papanikolaou and Rosenthal (2011) ’if the parties and the Commission are unable
to agree on remedies, a fairly common result is the withdrawal of the notification to avoid the
publication of a negative decision.’ However, since no ultimate decision is taken in case of withdrawals,
transparency and predictability may suffer.
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this merger policy tool compared to remedies, it appears that the EC blocks too few
mergers.
Finally, we measure significant deterrence effects pre- and post-reform. Pre-reform,
prohibitions achieve deterrence of anti-competitive mergers without deterring pro-competitive
mergers, which confirms their role as most effective merger control tool. Post-reform it
appears that withdrawals/abortions substitute for the role of prohibitions.
In conclusion, the introduction of the ECMR 04 seems to have changed European
merger policy. Yet, in terms of effectiveness along our four dimensions we paint a mixed
picture. While, on the one hand, decisions are based on a more economic analysis and
we observe a decline in the frequency of type I errors post-reform, we also find that the
increased focus on remedies was only partially successful and cannot replace the policy
tool of straight prohibitions. The latter solve both the competitive concerns raised by
the concentration and deter future anti-competitive mergers. Clearly, this policy shift
was not only the product of the reform, foremost, it might be the persistent reaction
to the substantial shock and political climate which originated from the Court of First
Instance’s reverses of three prominent cases in the early 2000s. Yet, an approach to
merger control that is more clearly based on economic principles does not necessarily
mean abandoning the use of prohibitions, as shown by US antitrust authorities that
are far less hesitant to block mergers than their European counterpart. The belief that
remedies are a more sophisticated and cleaner instrument to almost surgically appraise
merger cases seems, at least partially, misplaced. Thus, according to our analysis, while
some of the changes brought about by the reform seem to go in the right direction, the
positive impact on the efficiency of European merger control is dampened especially by
the fact that DG Comp deprives itself of its most powerful tool: prohibitions.
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6. Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Evolution of cases and decisions in the population
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We report notified cases per year (left axis) as well as the ratio of different decisions (remedies in
phase 1 and phase 2, prohibitions) to the notified cases (right axis).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample Population
Pre- Post-reform Pre- Post-reform
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Remedies 0.421 (0.49) 0.336 (0.47) 0.069 (0.05) 0.055 (0.04)
in Phase 1 0.144 (0.35) 0.237 (0.43) 0.041 (0.04) 0.044 (0.03)
in Phase 2 0.278 (0.45) 0.099 (0.30) 0.028 (0.03) 0.011 (0.01)
Cleared 0.523 (0.50) 0.651 (0.48) 0.931 (0.05) 0.945 (0.04)
Prohibited 0.056 (0.23) 0.013 (0.11) 0.008 (0.01) 0.001 (0.00)
Phase2 0.421 (0.49) 0.178 (0.38) 0.055 (0.23) 0.032 (0.18)
Aborted/Withdrawn 0.033 (0.03) 0.024 (0.01)
National markets 0.384 (0.49) 0.349 (0.48)
EU-wide markets 0.407 (0.49) 0.414 (0.49)
Worldwide markets 0.204 (0.40) 0.230 (0.42)
Conglomerate merger 0.250 (0.43) 0.382 (0.49)
Full merger 0.579 (0.49) 0.691 (0.46)
Crossborder merger 0.671 (0.47) 0.717 (0.45)
Barriers to entry 0.458 (0.50) 0.243 (0.43)
Dominant firm 0.523 (0.50) 0.500 (0.50)
US firms involved 0.315 (0.47) 0.316 (0.47)
Big EU country 0.644 (0.48) 0.618 (0.49)
MV merging 14.391 (5.02) 15.860 (6.22)
MV rivals 16.628 (5.11) 17.923 (5.84)
Observations 216 152 2403 1645
Market values (MV merging, MV rivals) are reported as logs of 1000 USD.
Table 2: CAARs of merging parties and rivals by period and event
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
N Mean S.E. N Mean S.E.
Merging Firms
Announcement 200 0.016∗∗ (0.01) 133 0.014∗∗ (0.008)
Decision 197 −0.003 (0.009) 133 −0.008∗ (0.005)
Rivals
Announcement 208 0.008 (0.008) 147 0.008∗ (0.006)
Decision 207 −0.003 (0.009) 147 −0.008∗ (0.006)
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 3: Probit Model: Probability of Intervention
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.258∗∗∗ (0.069) −0.340∗∗∗ (0.098)
Big EU country 0.005 (0.073) −0.068 (0.096)
Conglomerate Merger 0.174∗ (0.092) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.050)
Full merger 0.212∗∗∗ (0.043) −0.055∗∗∗ (0.016)
Crossborder merger −0.101 (0.078) −0.070∗∗∗ (0.027)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.015∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.006∗∗ (0.003)
Log(MV) rivals 0.012 (0.009) 0.019∗ (0.011)
Lagged notifications 0.002 (0.002) −0.001∗∗ (0.001)
Lagged actions ratio 0.501 (0.622) 1.592 (1.010)
Lagged abortions ratio −0.109 (1.137) −1.106 (3.319)
Observations 211 152
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.25
Correctly classified 70.6% 76.3%
The dependent variable is action, equal to one when the merger is remedied or
blocked, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in paren-
theses are robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same year.
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All regressions include a set of industry dummies and a time trend.
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Table 4: Breakdown by threshold
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Cases Share Cases Share Difference
p¯i = 0%
Procompetitive 100 0.48 76 0.52 0.04
Neutral 0 0 0 0 0
Anticompetitive 108 0.52 71 0.48 −0.04
p¯i = 3%
Procompetitive 74 0.36 39 0.27 −0.09∗∗
Neutral 53 0.25 62 0.42 0.17∗∗∗
Anticompetitive 81 0.39 46 0.31 −0.08∗
p¯i = 5%
Procompetitive 56 0.27 24 0.16 −0.11∗∗∗
Neutral 85 0.41 90 0.61 0.2∗∗∗
Anticompetitive 67 0.32 33 0.22 −0.1∗∗
p¯i = 10%
Procompetitive 27 0.13 8 0.05 −0.08∗∗∗
Neutral 142 0.68 126 0.86 0.18∗∗∗
Anticompetitive 39 0.19 13 0.09 −0.1∗∗∗
26
Table 5: Type I/II errors by period and definition of pro-/anti-competitivity
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Cases Mean S.D. Cases Mean S.D. Difference
0% threshold
Type I error (ΠACj < 0) 100 0.46 0.50 75 0.35 0.48 -0.11
∗
Type II error (ΠACj > 0) 108 0.52 0.50 71 0.65 0.48 0.13
∗∗
3% threshold
Type I error (ΠACj < −0.03) 74 0.47 0.50 39 0.36 0.49 -0.11
Type II error (ΠACj > 0.03) 81 0.58 0.5 46 0.63 0.49 0.05
5% threshold
Type I error (ΠACj < −0.05) 56 0.52 0.50 24 0.33 0.48 -0.19∗
Type II error (ΠACj > 0.05) 67 0.57 0.50 33 0.58 0.50 0.01
10% threshold
Type I error (ΠACj < −0.10) 27 0.56 0.51 8 0.25 0.46 -0.31∗
Type II error (ΠACj > 0.10) 39 0.51 0.51 13 0.46 0.52 -0.05
Frequency of type I errors (action in a pro-competitive merger) and type II errors (unconditional clearance
of an anti-competitive merger) in the sample.
Table 6: Probit Model: Probability of Type I errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.196∗ (0.117) −0.254∗∗ (0.105)
Big EU country 0.110 (0.070) −0.040 (0.145)
Conglomerate Merger −0.027 (0.049) 0.746∗∗∗ (0.194)
Full merger 0.258∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.174 (0.212)
Crossborder merger −0.196∗ (0.118) −0.182∗∗∗ (0.064)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.018∗ (0.010) 0.024∗∗ (0.010)
Log(MV) rivals 0.019∗ (0.010) −0.017 (0.014)
Barriers to entry 0.289∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.366∗∗∗ (0.114)
Phase 2 Case 0.507∗∗∗ (0.175) −0.028 (0.148)
National markets 0.339∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.724∗∗∗ (0.142)
Time trend −0.005 (0.003) 0.008 (0.007)
Observations 73 39
Pseudo R2 0.74 0.65
Correctly classified 90.4% 87.2%
The dependent variable is one if ΠA∗Cj < −0.03 and merger j was remedied or blocked and zero otherwise
(action in a pro-competitive merger). Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same year. The symbols ***, **, and *
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Probit Model: Probability of Type II errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved 0.134∗∗ (0.059) 0.185∗∗∗ (0.044)
Big EU country 0.057 (0.071) 0.141 (0.097)
Conglomerate Merger −0.296∗∗∗ (0.055) −0.297∗∗∗ (0.091)
Full merger 0.063 (0.075) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.029)
Crossborder merger 0.041 (0.058) 0.143∗∗ (0.063)
Log(MV) merging firms −0.020∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.010∗∗ (0.005)
Log(MV) rivals −0.013 (0.008) −0.028∗∗∗ (0.009)
Barriers to entry −0.314∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.417∗∗∗ (0.071)
Phase 2 Case −0.306∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.284∗∗∗ (0.109)
National markets −0.104∗∗ (0.051) −0.075 (0.202)
Time trend −0.001 (0.003) 0.007 (0.010)
Observations 80 46
Pseudo R2 0.65 0.50
Correctly classified 88.8% 82.6%
The dependent variable is one if ΠA∗Cj > 0.03 and merger j was cleared and zero otherwise (unconditional
clearance of an anti-competitive merger). Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same year. The symbols ***, **, and
* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 8: Effectiveness Regressions
Merging Parties Rivals
Pre reform
Clearance 0.037 (0.047) −0.009 (0.054)
Phase 1 Remedy 0.114 (0.120) −0.040 (0.135)
Phase 2 Remedy −0.061 (0.094) −0.028 (0.076)
Prohibitions −0.085 (0.176) −0.306∗∗ (0.111)
ΠA∗ij *Clearance −0.024 (0.067) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.057)
ΠA∗ij *Phase 1 Remedy 0.012 (0.148) 0.563
∗ (0.281)
ΠA∗ij *Phase 2 Remedy 0.018 (0.111) −0.369 (0.513)
ΠA∗ij *Prohibition −1.265∗∗∗ (0.423) −0.442∗∗∗ (0.101)
Post reform
Clearance 0.031 (0.092) −0.028 (0.091)
Phase 1 Remedy 0.103 (0.100) −0.043 (0.084)
Phase 2 Remedy −0.008 (0.126) −0.081 (0.105)
ΠA∗ij *Clearance 0.039 (0.046) 0.278
∗∗ (0.112)
ΠA∗ij *Phase 1 Remedy −0.109 (0.178) 0.009 (0.170)
ΠA∗ij *Phase 2 Remedy 0.998
∗∗ (0.466) 0.931∗∗∗ (0.317)
Observations 325 349
R2 0.20 0.25
The dependent variable is the decision corrected CAAR in merger j (ΠD∗fj ) for the
merging firms (i = M) and competitors (i = C) respectively. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same
year. We control for merger-specific effects (full, crossborder and conglomerate
mergers) and a time trend. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Deterrence Regressions
Procompetitive Anticompetitive
Pre reform
Lagged notifications 0.009 (0.012) −0.003 (0.007)
Lagged remedies ph1 −7.639 (6.277) 2.207 (8.737)
Lagged remedies ph2 0.650 (10.116) 1.391 (10.535)
Lagged abortions ph1 27.063∗∗∗ (8.495) 40.852∗∗∗ (8.660)
Lagged abortions ph2 38.242∗∗ (16.039) 55.054∗∗∗ (20.016)
Lagged prohibitions −38.672 (26.428) −55.247∗∗ (24.429)
Post reform
Lagged notifications 0.023 (0.020) −0.045∗∗∗ (0.006)
Lagged remedies ph1 −6.721 (5.585) −33.958∗∗ (15.826)
Lagged remedies ph2 −48.243 (60.431) 32.446∗∗∗ (5.809)
Lagged abortions ph1 −87.640∗∗∗ (10.941) −77.644∗∗∗ (20.559)
Lagged abortions ph2 101.736 (123.704) −106.109∗∗∗ (29.293)
Post Reform 2004 0.542 (1.067) 5.670∗∗∗ (1.149)
Time trend −0.017 (0.026) 0.017 (0.017)
Observations 347 347
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11
The dependent variable is Dj = 1 if ΠA∗Cj ≤ 3%, Dj = 2 if 3% ≤ ΠA∗Cj ≤ 3%, and Dj = 3
if ΠA∗Cj ≥ 3%. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow for correlation among
observations from the same year. We control for merger-specific effects (full, cross-border
and conglomerate mergers). The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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A. Quantifying the Effect of a Merger and Merger Decision
The estimation of the impact of a merger and merger decision proceeds in several steps.
First, we estimate a market model for each firm, which allows us to simulate the counter-
factual scenario of what would have happened if the merger had not occured. Using this
information, we then calculate the cumulative abnormal rents generated by the merger or
merger decision over an event window spanning several days around the relevant dates.
We then aggregate the cumulative abnormal returns for the merging firms and their rivals,
to obtain a merger-specific information. Finally, we assume that market participants can
- to a certain degree - foresee the merger decisions, which is priced in the stock of firms
around the relevant event. Hence, to obtain a more precise measure of the competitive
effect of the merger and merger decision, we correct for these market expectations.
A.1. The Market Model
Define Ri,j as the return of firm i at date j and Rmarketi,j as the market return index of
the branch of firm i. The market model predicts that the daily return of a commodity
i is proportional to the market index at any given point in time t. Formally: Ri,t =
α+ βRmarket,t + εi,t.15 We can then calibrate the coefficients of this model for all firms
i = 1, . . . , N over a time period of 240 trading days, namely the period from 290 to 50
days prior to the announcement of the merger.16 Letting the estimation window end
50 days before the announcement (that is, the date on which the financial press wrote
about the proposed transaction) should yield unbiased estimates of the market model’s
coefficients and, hence, the ’normal’ firms’ return, which is our counterfactual and that
is given by: R̂i,t = α̂ + β̂Rmarket,t. When observing a stock market reaction to the
announcement of a particular event, the change in the equity value (with respect to the
’normal’ value) of firms affected by this event can then be taken as a measure of the
(discounted) additional profits that are expected to accrue as a consequence of the event.
This stock reaction, also called abnormal return, is a measure of the profitability of such
an event and can be measured as ARi,t = Ri,t − R̂i,t.
15For the superiority of a market model over a constant mean return model in capturing abnormal
returns see MacKinlay (1997) or Schwert (1981).
16For some cases the market model could not be reliably estimated in this period due to data limitations.
In these cases the estimations window was shifted to 530 - 290 days prior to announcement.
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A.2. The Event Windows
The event windows are the time intervals around the dates of the relevant events (e.g.
merger or merger decision), during which new information hits the market. In the absence
of any information leakages, these windows can be reduced to the event day. The larger
the expectations that some information was leaked to the market prior to the event, the
larger the window should be. Hence, the length of these windows is critical to the event
study’s ability to capture the profitability effects: if the window is too small, the effect
might not be wholly captured, whereas too large a window could dilute the result.17 To
account for the structurally different circumstances of the various events we consider, we
use both a long as well as a short window. The long window is the interval [t− 50, t+ 5]
(where t designates the date of the event), the short window is [t− 5, t+ 5].
For the announcement and the phase 2 decision, we employ the long window. In both
cases information leakages could occur substantially earlier than the date of the event in
question. Rumors of mergers often circulate for weeks before definitive signs reach the
financial press. The same holds for an in-depth merger investigation in phase 2, during
which the Commission often contacts competitors and customers of the merging firms
during its assessment and information is likely to leak to the market.18 These prolonged
processes could easily reduce uncertainty and allow the concerned parties to adjust their
anticipations.
The phase 1 investigation, on the other hand, lasts only 25 working days and is con-
ducted internally by DG Comp. Furthermore, a substantial part of this relatively short
time is utilized for the appraisal of administrative issues. We therefore assume that in-
formation leakages to the market occur no earlier than 5 days before the decision and
that the stock prices adjust in a short window around the decision. The event windows
are schematically depicted in figure 2.
A.3. Aggregating the Abnormal Returns
The abnormal return of firm i at date j is defined as
ARi,j = Ri,j − Rˆi,j .
17Issues concerning the length of event windows and their ability to capture the effect of regulation are
more thoroughly discussed in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010).
18The EC has a time-frame of 90 working days between phase 1 and phase 2 decisions.
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Figure 2: Timeline of the events
ann - 50         ann         ph1          ph2
[ann - 290, ann - 50]
Market model estimation
[ann - 50, ann + 5]
CAAR ann
[ph1 - 5, ph1 + 5]
CAAR ph1
[ph2 - 50, ph2 + 5]
CAAR ph2
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are then obtained by summing up the abnormal
returns over the event window (t1, t2):
CARi(t1, t2) =
t2∑
t=t1
ARi,t.
These CARs measure the profitability impact of a combination at the firm-level. Mea-
suring firm-level effects has the advantage of allowing for asymmetric externalities of a
merger.19 While we allow for asymmetric externalities at the firm-level, the definition
of an anti-competitive merger has to be done at the aggregate level, since what matters
for the policy is the impact of the merger on the overall consumer surplus. Hence, to
obtain a measure of the total impact of a merger, we aggregate the merging firms’ as well
as rivals’ CARs at the merger level by using the relative market value of each firm as a
weight.20 The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) at event e (announcement,
decision) for firms f (f = M for merging firms and C for their competitors) in merger j
are then given by
CAARefj =
Nfj∑
i=1
CARei mvi
Nfj∑
i=1
mvi
e = ann, dec f = M,C j = 1, . . . , 326 (6)
where Nfj denotes the number of merging firm or rivals for merger j and mvi is the
market value of firm i. The CAARs, as an aggregate measure of the implications of a
19It is an empirically well-documented phenomenon that merger targets usually experience stock market
gains, whereas buyers often lose. Likewise, the externalities on rivals need not be evenly distributed
as the degree of competition among firms might vary.
20The idea of a ’firm portfolio’ weighted by market values is owed to Schwert (1981).
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merger, are used to classify pro- and anti-competitive mergers and serve in the probability
of intervention estimation.
A.4. Correcting for Expectations
We assume that market participants can to a certain degree anticipate the decisions of
DG Comp, but that there is no perfect foresight: If the market could perfectly foresee
the actions of the EC, there would be no significant stock reactions around the decision
dates. The fact that there are significant deviations from the market trend when news of
a decision reaches the concerned market participants can be interpreted as evidence in
favor of our assumption. Furthermore, the existence of prohibitions contradicts perfect
foresight: if managers could perfectly foresee the actions of DG Comp, mergers that end
up being blocked would not have been attempted in the first place, nor would there have
been significant reactions in response to their announcements.
Using the past merger control history and the knowledge of the structural character-
istics of a proposed merger, firms can form a prior of how likely it is that DG Comp
will intervene. This means that the observed abnormal returns around the event dates
do not measure the full effect but are the expectation-adjusted abnormal returns, which
take into account that the combination might not go through or be subjected to reme-
dies.21 Since we assume that the market’s assessment reveals the competitive nature of
a combination, we would like to remove this adjustment of expectations to obtain the
market assessment in absence of merger control.
If expectations are rational, the expected value of the EC’s decision is:22
E[Πdec] = ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear (7)
where Πaction(Πclear) denotes the merger’s profitability in case of an action (a clear-
ance) and ρ is the probability of an action. The observed abnormal returns around the
announcement (Πann) therefore are equal to the real effect (Πann∗) plus the expected
value of the EC’s final decision (E[Πdec]). Assuming that an intervention by DG Comp
destroys the anti-competitive rents generated by a combination (Πaction = −Πann∗) in
21An (extreme) example of a prohibition might clarify the intuition. If we measure a rent of 100
million US dollars around the merger announcement, but the ex-ante expectation of the market is
that the EC will block this merger with a probability of 20%, the full extent of rents is actually
(100/(1− 0.2)) = US$125 million.
22Note that, to ease notation, we eliminate the subscript for the firms’ types (f = M for merging firms
and f = C for competitors) and the merger j.
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their full extent (Πdec∗ = Πann∗),23 and that a clearance has no further effect on the
market (Πclear = 0), the impact of a merger can be written as:
Πann = Πann∗ + E[Πdec] = Πann∗ + ρ Πaction︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Πann∗
+(1− ρ) Πclear︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
⇔ Πann∗ = Π
ann
1− ρ (8)
Similarly, the effect that we measure around the decision (Πdec) is an update of the
market’s beliefs concerning that particular decision and, hence, the difference between
the merger’s competitive effect and the market expectations of the commission decision’s
effect.24
Πdec = Πdec∗ + E[Πdec] = Πdec∗ + ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear ⇔ Πdec∗ = Π
dec
1− ρ
If a case goes into phase 2, the market will again update its beliefs about remedies.25
The effect around the phase 1 decision accounts for the adjustment of market expectations
to the new state of beliefs, the sum of both decision effects captures the total impact of
the EC’s decision. The real effect of the decision is then given by
Πdec∗ =
ΠP1 + ΠP2
1− ρ
where ΠP1 (ΠP2) is the measured effect around the phase 1 (phase 2) decision date.
Combining the equations for the decisions yields
Πdec∗ =
Π
dec
1−ρ if phase 1 case
ΠP1+ΠP2
1−ρ if phase 2 case
. (9)
Thus, to account for expectations, we need to estimate the ex-ante likelihood of an
intervention for every merger j (ρj) and correct the CAARs measured around the an-
nouncement (ΠAfj) and the decision (Π
D
fj) of that merger according to equations (8) and
(9). This refinement improves the precision of the estimate of the market competitive
assessment of a merger.
23We realize that this assumption might be questioned, but it is necessary for probability correction and
seems less arbitrary than ex-ante assuming a certain nonzero degree of rent reversal.
24If the market had perfect foresight, we would measure only white noise around the decision. The
surprise value of the decision is due to the private information generated during the legal proceedings.
25The probability of a clearance subject to conditions and obligations is much higher for phase 2 cases
than for phase 1 cases; a blocking is possible only after a phase 2 investigation.
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B. Robustness Checks
B.1. Purely Horizontal Mergers
The correspondence between the change in consumer surplus and competitors’ profits
does not necessarily hold for non-horizontal mergers. In all regressions we control for
this issue by using a dummy equal to 1 for all cases in which the Commission mentioned
conglomerate, vertical, or foreclosure effects as one of its leading arguments in support
of the final decision. In this section we discuss the results that we obtain by dropping
these 112 cases from our sample, which leaves us with 162 mergers pre-reform and 94
post-reform.
The decision models of the probability of an intervention are not strongly affected
by this: some of the significances of the political dummies and market value variables
change and - contrary to the specification reported - the goodness-of-fit measures of the
investigation model increase in the post-reform period.26 This suggests that some of the
changes particularly affected non-horizontal mergers.
The results on decision errors remain qualitatively unaffected as well. The reduction
in type I errors after the reform, ranging between 15 and 36% remains significant for
most definitions of p¯i, the finding that more welfare-neutral mergers are notified after the
reform remains as well.
When re-estimating the rent reversion regressions in the purely horizontal subsample,
the finding that prohibitions achieve a large degree of rent reversion is confirmed, but
the merging parties’ coefficient loses its significance due to higher standard errors. The
slope coefficients of unconditional clearances in the rival regressions increase and become
significant in both periods. Thus rivals seem to profit more from cleared horizontal
mergers, which is consistent with economic theory. The slope of phase 1 remedies is
significantly negative in the rival regressions in both periods and significantly negative
for merging firms in the pre-reform period. It appears that phase 1 remedies are more
successful when applied to purely horizontal combinations.
The deterrence of pro-competitive mergers in the horizontal subsample is largely on
par with the results from the full sample, with some reduced significances. The results
on deterrence of anti-competitive mergers hold qualitatively as well, although we find
fewer significant variables in the post-reform period: only phase 1 remedies and phase 1
abortions significantly deter anti-competitive notifications.
26Due to lack of space, we do not report all tables. The extensive results can, however, be obtained
from the authors upon request.
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Overall we conclude that focusing on purely horizontal mergers does not alter the
qualitative results and even reinforces some of them.
B.2. The Timing of the Reform
To identify the effect of the reform, we choose the official date at which it legally came
into force as a marking point for the pre- and post-reform periods. This choice of timing
has a clear justification, since the EC could not have used the legal framework provided
by ECMR 04 before this date. However, there might be reason to think that the right
timing to assess the change in policy could have been before or after this date. On the one
hand, it could have been before, because some of the reform’s elements were implemented
during the months antecedent the legal introduction of the new merger regulation and
could have affected the Commission’s policy enforcement.27 On the other hand, the
right timing to start the reform’s assessment could also have been after May 2004, since
it might have taken time before some of the innovations brought by the reform had a
clear policy impact. Hence, we propose two robustness checks for this issue. First, we
date the starting of the post-reform period back to the beginning of 2003. Second, we
eliminate the entire year 2004 from the sample.
In both cases, the results on the predictability of the policy pre-reform do not change
substantially. The changes in the frequency of type I and type II errors become small
and insignificant if we define the post-reform period to start at the beginning of 2003.
This could hint at the fact that 2003 still belongs to the ’old’ regime and including it
in the post-reform period conceals the changes. Conversely, when dropping 2004 from
the sample, the changes in the decision errors remain quantitatively similar, while their
significances are slightly reduced. The rent-reversion regressions are not strongly affected
by either change in timing. Finally, choosing the beginning of 2003 as the introduction
year makes phase 2 abortions lose their post-reform deterrent properties found in the main
specification, while phase 1 abortions continue to significantly deter anti-competitive
mergers. However, when we exclude the entire year 2004, the findings obtained in the
main regressions are reproduced and their significance is restored.
All in all then, it seems that our qualitative results also hold if we adopt another
date for the formal introduction of the merger policy reform. However, results are more
significant, clear cut and in line with our main specification when we exclude the year
27Lyons (2004), for instance, notices that several changes in merger control were being implemented
around 2003, such as the introduction of devil’s advocate panels, the proposal of a clarification of
the dominance test, the appointment of the first chief economist, the publishing of the draft merger
guidelines and the extension for timetable for remedies.
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2004. This suggests that the change in policy around the legal introduction of ECMR 04
was substantial and supports the choice of May 2004 to identify the effects of the reform.
B.3. Different thresholds for pro- and anti-competitivity
The choice of the threshold beyond which a merger is labeled as pro- or anti-competitive,
i.e. the choice of p¯i, is an arbitrary one. Without measurement error, the most natural
choice would be a threshold of p¯i ≶ 0; however, we expect a degree of noise in the
data. In the main body of the paper, we reported the frequency of decision errors when
using either a 0, 3, 5 or 10% threshold, while the determinants of decision errors and
the deterrence regressions were restricted to the p¯i = 3% specification. This choice of
threshold was motivated by the facts that a zero threshold implies a lot of noise and thus
biases results towards insignificance, while the two higher threshold choices strongly limit
the number of available observations. The following paragraphs describe the regression
results, when these thresholds are applied.
The determinants of decision errors do not qualitatively change when we choose a
threshold of p¯i = 0; however, for thresholds of 5 or 10% the determinants cannot be
estimated due to a lack of observations, particularly in the post-reform period.
The two main findings of the deterrence regressions - that prohibitions in the pre-
reform period and in particular phase 2 abortions in the post-reform period significantly
deter anti-competitive merger notifications - are robust if we choose p¯i = 5%. For a
threshold of 0, only a binary probit model can be estimated, which confirms the post-
reform deterrence exercised by phase 2 abortions. However, prohibitions deter only
insignificantly in this setting. Setting the threshold at p¯i = 10% leaves too few pro- and
anti-competitive outcomes for the multinomial probit model to converge.
All things considered, the choice of p¯i = 3% appears to be a good compromise between
measurement error and sample size.
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